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MUNICIPAL LAW
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
T HE OHIO SUPREME COURT continued in 1983 to expand and define its
abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity for municipal cor-
porations and political subdivisions. The court's decisions in this area have
resulted in a significant increase in tort liability for local governments and school
districts, who may now be found liable for tortious acts in the same manner
as private individuals.
The defense of governmental immunity, though statutorily waived by the
state in 1975,1 remained intact for municipal corporations.2 Municipal corpora-
tions have been characterized as being both a subdivision of the state and a
corporate entity.' Therefore, the law traditionally attempted to distinguish be-
tween the two functions, and where the municipalities represented the state
in its governmental, political, or public capacity they also shared its immunity
from tort liability. Conversely, while acting in their corporate, private, or pro-
prietary character they could be held liable." Ohio had recognized this
governmental-proprietary distinction in a long series of cases,' affording
municipal corporations immunity in the performance of its governmental func-
tions unless otherwise provided by statute,' while denying immunity to a
municipal corporation in the performance of its proprietary functions.
7
Recognizing that "attempts to classify municipal functions into these two
categories have caused confusion and unpredictability in the law"' and that
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Baldwin 1982) provides:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability
determined, in the court of claims... with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private
parties except that the determination of liability is subject to the limitations set forth in this
chapter .... To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has
no applicability.
'See Hass v. Hayslip, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 364 N.E.2d 1376 (1977) where the court held that OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2743.01-.02 (Baldwin 1977), did not abrogate the defense of sovereign immunity for
municipal corporations in the performance of their governmental functions. See also Note, Hass v. Hayslip:
Ohio's Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 5 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 133 (1978).
'W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 131 (4th ed. 1982) states: "On the one hand they are subdivisions of the
state, endowed with governmental powers and charged with government functions and responsibilities.
On the other they are corporate bodies, capable of much the same acts as private corporations, and having
the same special and local interests and relations not shared by the state at large. They are at one and
the same a corporate entity and a government." Id.
'Id.
'For a dicsussion of the historical development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity of municipal
corporations see Hass v. Akron, 51 Ohio St. 2d 135, 140, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1379-80 (1977) (Brown, J.
dissenting); Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 391, 189 N.E.2d 857, 862-63 (1963).
'See, e.g., Broughton v. Cleveland, 167 Ohio St. 2d 29, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1957).
'See, e.g., Sears v. Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 2d 157, 285 N.E.2d 732 (1972).
'Haverlack v. Portage Homes, 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 29, 442 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1982) (Celebrezze, C.J.). See
also Comment, Local Government Sovereign Immunity: The Need for Reform, 18 WAKE FORES L. REv.
43 (1982).
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this "bramble bush... deserves clarification with the formulation of a definite
rule of law"' the Ohio Supreme Court abolished the distinction between the
two classifications. In Haverlack v. Portage Home, Inc. the court held that
a "municipal corporation, unless immune by statute, is liable for its negligence
in the performance or nonperformance of its act,"' 0 thus abrogating the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in the Ohio courts.
Supreme Court cases following Haverlack have attempted to define the
rather vague boundaries of the judicially created municipal liability." This note
will examine recent Supreme Court decisions in which the Haverlack holding
is further expanded and defined in an effort to delineate the present boundaries
of the expanded liability for political subdivisions.
The thrust of the Haverlack decision was its attempt to avoid the need
to classify a municipal corporation's activities into either a governmental or
proprietary category.'" However, the court recognized in King v. Williams'3
that it might not be as easy to dismiss the classifications as it had hoped. The
presence of Ohio Revised Code § 701.02,'" which affords immunity to a
municipal corporation under certain circumstances, required the court to recon-
sider the governmental-proprietary distinction in order to conclude that the
"operation of a city fire department is a governmental function"' 5 and that
the statute provided the municipal corporation with a complete defense to the
negligence claim. While not an expansion of the Haverlack rule, King's im-
portance lies in the court's indication that the only limits to the potential liability
of the municipal corporation were those statutorily created.' 6
'Haverlack, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 29, 442 N.E.2d at 752.
"Id. at 30, 442 N.E.2d at 752. Haverlack involved a complaint by petitioners over odor and noise caused
by a sewage treatment plant that was operated by the city of Aurora for the benefit of a residential complex
known as Walden.
"Justice Locher noted in his dissent that the holding in Haverlack failed to provide guidance to other
political subdivisions (i.e., counties, townships, school districts) as to whether those governmental units
were no longer protected by the sovereign immunity defense. He stated that "the majority opinion, therefore,
provides neither explanation as to why it singled out this particular governmental function nor guidance
as to what is next to fall." Id. at 32, 442 N.E.2d at 753 (Locher, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 30, 442 N.E.2d at 751.
"King v. Williams, 5 Ohio St. 3d 137, 449 N.E.2d 452 (1983). In King, the driver of an emergency medical
vehicle operated by the city of Akron struck an automobile driven by the defendant while en route to
an emergency. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sued both the driver and the city of Akron for
damages for the alleged negligent conduct of the driver. Id.
4OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 701.02 (Baldwin 1982) provides:
The defense that the officer, agent, or servant of the municipal corporation was engaged in performing
a governmental function, shall be a complete defense as to the negligence of:
(B) Members of the fire department while engaged in duty at a fire, or while proceeding toward
a place where a fire is in progress or is believed to be in progress, or in answering any other emergency
alarm.
Firemen shall not be personally liable for damages for injury or loss to persons or property
and for death caused while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle in the performance of a
governmental function.
"King, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 140, 449 N.E.2d at 455.
"Id. at 140, 449 N.E.2d at 455.
[Vol. 17:4
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In Dickerhoof v. Canton'7 the court recognized that where the presence
of a statute could afford a municipal corporation immunity'8 it could also afford
a basis for liability for failing to keep the shoulder of a highway in repair and
free from nuisance.' 9 The court in Dickerhoof reduced the issue to "whether
appellant had a duty, imposed by statute or the common law, to keep the
shoulder of the highway in repair and free from nuisance." 0 Thus, it is clear
that the court will utilize statutory interpretation in determining both the ex-
istence and absence of a duty owed by the municipal corporation.
The case of Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd.2'
presented the Ohio Supreme Court with the issue of whether the doctrine of
government immunity from tort liability for municipalities should be sustained
in Ohio.22 Enghauser involved a claim that the city of Lebanon had negligently
planned, designed, and constructed a new bridge and roadway which proxi-
mately resulted in the flooding of appellant's abutting industrial property.
Appellants also alleged nuisance, trespass, and appropriation of property.23
In Enghauser, the court unequivocally stated that "henceforth, so far as
municipal governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is
liability - the exception is immunity."2 ' The court rejected the argument that
if a departure from a longstanding rule of public policy is warranted, then the
extent of liability should be fixed by the legislature. 5
Acknowledging that the doctrine of municipal immunity was judicially
created and thus a "creature of the courts," 2 6 the court proceeded to "evaluate
"Dickerhoof v. Canton, 6 Ohio St. 3d 128, 451 N.E.2d 1193 (1983). See also Strohofer v. Cincinnati,
6 Ohio St. 3d 118, 451 N.E.2d 787 (1983). Strohofer concerned whether the city of Cincinnati had acted
negligently and created a nuisance by erecting and maintaining traffic control lights in a manner which
confused motorists at an interseciton where a collision occurred.
"Dickerhoof, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 129, 451 N.E.2d at 1194.
"Id. at 129, 451 N.E.2d at 1194. The court relied on construction of OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 723.01
(Baldwin 1982) and OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 305.12 (Baldwin 1982) in concluding that the General
Assembly had imposed a statutory duty and provided a basis for actions against municipalities concerning
highways.
'Old. at 131, 451 N.E.2d at 1194. Recent Ohio cases have emphasized the issue of how far the duty of
a municipal corporation extends: in particular, the standard of care owed motorists traveling the public
highways and streets. Strohofer established that statutorily-based duty of care is imposed upon the municipal
corporaiton, extending even to the chuckholes in the shoulder of a road. However, in Strunk v. Dayton,
6 Ohio St. 3d 429, 453 N.E.2d 104 (1983) the court declined to extend the boundaries of municipal liability
to property adjacent to a roadway. See also Geideman v. Bay Village, 7 Ohio St. 2d 79, 218 N.E.2d 621
(1966); Dickerhoof v. Canton, 6 Ohio St. 3d 128, 451 N.E.2d 1193 (1983); Royce v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.
106, 429 N.E.2d 134 (1981).
2"6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 451 N.E.2d 228 (1983).
"See, e.g., State v. Franklin Bank of Columbus, 10 Ohio Reptr. 91 (1840); Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St.
80 (1854); Western Coliege of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 (1861); Thacker v.
Board of Trustees of Ohio St. Univ., 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973).
"Enghauser, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 31, 451 N.E.2d at 229.
'Id. at 32, 451 N.E.2d at 230.
11Id. at 33, 451 N.E.2d at 230. The court stated that "[t]his type of argument begs the whole question
of the desirability of the doctrine and relegates the whole problem to a discussion of who should change
the doctrine." Id.
"Id. at 33, 451 N.E.2d at 230.
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the doctrine of municipal immunity in light of reason, logic, and the actions,
functions, and duties of a municipality in the twentieth century." 27 The court
considered the doctrine of municipal immunity from liability in tort from its
genesis in Russell v. Men of Devon,28 concluding that "it would be a sad com-
mentary on our concept of justice if this court continued to endorse the belief
that an individual should sustain an injury rather than the municipality be
inconvenienced," 2 9 and that "the widespread availability and use of insurance
or other modern funding methods render an argument based on economics
invalid." 3" Further, the court maintained that stare decisis was not a compell-
ing reason to retain immunity:
The judicial conscience must no longer permit us to tolerate a principle
of human behavior which, out of hand, denies the injured, the maimed,
and representatives of the deceased a right of action against a wrongdoing
simply because the wrongdoer is an employee or agent of the municipality.
If municipalities are to expose the people and their property to negligent
acts, then they must expect to respond to suit. Municipal corporations
in Ohio should no longer receive protection from a doctrine whose only
claim to judicial integrity is that it is ancient."
The court did, however, proceed to clarify the limitations of the holding:
"This court's abrogation of municipal immunity does not mean that a municipal
entity is liable for all harm that results from its activities; it is only to those
harms which are torts that municipalities may now be held liable."32 The court
carefully reemphasized its Haverlack holding, stating, "Nor will a municipality
be subject to liability where a statute provides for immunity." 33 And the most
critical limitation of the holding:
Accordingly, this court holds that no tort action will lie against a municipal
corporation for those acts or omissions involving the exercise of a legislative
or judicial function, or the exercise of an executive or planning function
involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by
the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion; however,
once the decision has been made to engage in a certain activity or func-
tion, municipalities will be held liable, the same as private corporations
and persons, for negligence of their employees and agents in the perfor-
mance of the activity.34
"Id. at 33, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
"Municipalities were first extended immunity from suit in tort in 1788 in Russell v. Men of Devon, 100
Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) where the court held that immunity was warranted because there were not corporate
funds out of which the judgment could be satisfied and because "it is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public shoulid suffer an inconvenience." Id. at 362.
"Enghauser, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
"Id. at 34, 451 N.E.2d at 231.
"Id. at 34-35, 451 N.E.2d at 231-32.
11Id. at 35, 451 N.E.2d at 232 (emphasis added).
"Id.
"Id. at 36, 451 N.E.2d at 232 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 17:4
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The court's holding is adamant in maintaining that "this decision should not
be interpreted as abolishing those essential acts which go to the essence of
governing."" However, the dissenting opinion by Justice Holmes expressed
concern that the language used by the majority was "ambiguous" and pro-
vides a municipal employee with little guidance as to which functions involve
a high degree of discretion and which do not, "leaving the employee with little
specificity and practical guidance as to when he will be second guessed," and
finally characterizing the standards left to guide the municipal corporations
as "slippery." 36 Indeed, broad statements by the court such as "the rule is
liability - the exception is immunity"37 do offer little guidance to municipal
corporations who now face liability in tort.
Enghauser was most recently expanded in Carbone v. Overfield. 3 In that
case the father of a six year old student who was severely burned when boiling
water being carried in a cauldron by students was spilled on him, brought an
action against the school district board of education to recover for his child's
injuries. The board of education moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.39 The trial court
granted the board's motion and the court of appeals affirmed.
Refusing to "retreat" from its previous extensions of the abrogation of
sovereign immunity, the court held that the defense of sovereign immunity was
not available to a board of education in an action for injuries allegedly caused
by the negligence of the board's employees; thus making boards of education
liable for tortious acts in the same manner as private individuals."0 The court
dismissed the two justifications for retention of the doctrine advanced in
Enghauser, finding them inapplicable in an action dealing with a board of
education.'
"Id.
"Id. at 38, 451 N.E.2d at 234 (Locher, J., dissenting). Justice Lochner approved the court's attempt to
limit the abolition of municipal immunity.
17Id. at 33, 451 N.E.2d at 230.
"6 Ohio St. 3d 212, 451 N.E.2d 1229 (1983).
"See, e.g., Board of Education v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646 (1905). The court recognized a
distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from tort liability, with the result that a statute
granting a school district the right to sue or be sued did not affect its tort immunity. See generally 48
0. JUR. 2D Schools § 245 (1966).
"Carbone, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 213, 451 N.E.2d at 1230.
"In Carbone, the majority stated that it was more desirable for the local government entity to bear the
loss than the injured individual. Id. at 214, 451 N.E.2d at 1230.
The majority also asserted that the General Assembly had already granted boards of education the
authority to purchase liability insurance in order to protect themselves. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.203
(Page 1980). However, the dissent by Justice Locher claimed that OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.203 only
allows a board of education to purchase liability insurance for individuals in their official capacities as
members or employees of the board. Justice Holmes also cited the Ohio Attorney General, who stated
that "in the absence of [specific] statutory authority, a board of education has the power to purchase
insurance for a liability arising out of risks other than ones pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles."
1971 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 71-028, at 2-89 (cited in Carbone, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 214, 215, 451 N.E.2d
at 1231).
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Both Enghauser and Carbone stressed the availability of liability insurance
to insure the municipal corporations and boards of education from tort liability.
Indeed, obtaining liability insurance is the most viable course of action open
to political subdivisions."' As a result of the expansion of Haverlack, municipal
corporations will certainly be forced to obtain some type of insurance protec-
tion to prevent against a tremendous uninsured loss.43
A particular problem presented to political subdivisions, and noted by
Justice Holmes in both Enghauser and Carbone, is that the court has failed
to delineate whether the decision to abrogate sovereign immunity should be
prospective or retroactive." Justice Holmes advocated the prospective abrogation
of the doctrine, with compelling reasons in support of his position. He noted
that "we impose liability on municipalities without allowing them the oppor-
tunity to obtain liability insurance.""' As noted above, the impact of a deci-
sion imposing liability on a municipal corporation or political subdivisions which
is not protected by liability insurance could be catastrophic. Secondly, Justice
Holmes emphatically urged that "this immunity should be annulled prospec-
tively so that the General Assembly will be given an opportunity to act upon
our decision. It is that branch of government which is best equipped to balance
our competing considerations of public policy."" The Justice's statement is
a continuing echo of earlier pleas to the General Assembly to enact a "prac-
tical, comprehensive solution""7 before the court's decision became effective
- regretful that such a potentially impacting decision on local governments
was not left to the General Assembly.
Justice Holmes' pleas have not gone unheeded. As of this writing, House
Bill 48248 is being debated in the Civil and Commercial Committee of the Ohio
House of Representatives. House Bill 482 would restore sovereign immunity
"Note, supra note 2, at 141. The writer argued that if the municipality operates or maintains injury-inducing
activities or conditions, the cost of any resulting harm should be regarded as part of the normal operating
costs of a public administration, rather than as a diversion of public funds. See also David, Tort Liability
of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity From Liability or Suit, 6 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1959); Fuller
& Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1941).
"'Note, supra note 2, at 141.
1'Enghauser, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 41, 451 N.E.2d at 233. Justice Holmes noted that generally the decisions
of the court which overrule former decisions are applied retroactively.
4'1d. at 37, 451 N.E.2d at 233.
"Id. at 37, 451 N.E.2d at 234. Justice Holmes maintained that the prospective abolition of sovereign
immunity would be in accord with the "overwhelming" weight of authority from other jurisdictions who
have considered the issue. See, e.g., Evans v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968
(1971); Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d
26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
"6 Ohio St. 3d at 38, 451 N.E.2d at 234. Justice Holmes stated that "this court's decision in the area
of governmental immunity cries out for a legislative response. I, for one, hopefully anticipate that the
General Assembly will proceed as have the legislative bodies in other states and enact comprehensive laws."
Id.
"Ohio H.B. 482, 115th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983-84), to amend OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.60,
133.27, 305.12, 505.43, 504.431, 505.50, 723.01, 723.54, 737.04, 737.041, 1343.03, 4731.90, 5511.01, to
enact §§ 2744.01 to 2744.08 and to repeal §§ 505.05, 505.06, 701.02, 5571.10.
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to political subdivisions and specify their liabilities. If enacted, this bill could
restore the defense of sovereign immunity to political subdivisions, thus
abrogating its judicial abolition and the subsequent extensions of liability
imposed upon the political subdivisions.
KATHY SUE MAGOLINE
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